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Recent Cases
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States1
Sometime in 1962 five coral reefs, "scarcely 4 miles off Elliott Key and
10 miles off the Coast off [sic.] the Florida Mainland, ' 2 were "discovered" 3 by
William T. Anderson. He gave public notice, both in the United States and England, of his claim to them. Atlantis Development Corporation, a Bahamian corporation, acquired Anderson's "rights" in the reefs, and it applied to the State of Florida
and to the Department of Interior and Department of State at the federal level
for permission to construct various types of entertainment facilities on them. In
answer to its applications, Atlantis received information, the essence of which is
reflected in the State Department's reply that: "The areas in question are outside
of the jurisdiction of the United States and constitute a part of the high seas. The
high seas are open to all nations and no state may validly subject any part of
them to its sovereignty.... ."4 Atlantis subsequently spent some $50,000 on surveys,
construction, and the like in an effort to equip the islands with facilities. It was
brought to Atlantis' attention, however, that the United States Corps of Engineers
was asserting that permission was needed in order to erect structures on the two
islands of Triumph Reef and Long Reef. In 1964, there having been several unsuccessful attempts to have the position of the Corps reversed, Atlantis learned
that the defendants in the main case5 had also formally sought permits from the
Engineers. Although the exact manner in which the defendants in the main case
became involved is not exactly clear, it appears that the defendants, unknown to
Atlantis, entered upon two of the reefs, began construction on them, and later
sought the same permission as Atlantis had sought from the Corps of Engineers to
erect structures on the reefs. In any event, Atlantis quickly notified the government of its claim to ownership of the islands and of the threatened unauthorized
acts of the defendants. After several communications with the United States govern1. 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
2. Id. at 820.
3. "The 'facts' are as yet unknown since no trial of either the main or the
intervention case has been had. They are revealed in this record solely in the
complaint, the answer, the proposed intervention, and supporting affidavit.
Id. at 820, note 2 in the opinion.
4. Id. at 821.
5. "Acme General Contractors, Inc., and J. H. Coppedge Company, each
Florida corporations, and Louis M. Ray, a resident of Dade County, Florida."
Id. at 821 note 5 in the opinion.

(655)
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ment, Atlantis successfully urged the government to institute the action in the
main case.
The government sought injunctive relief against the defendants in the main
case in both counts of its petition. It was asserted that Triumph and Long Reefs
were part of the bed of the Atlantic Ocean included in the Outer Continental
Shelf subject to the jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition of the United
States. It was further alleged that the defendants' actions in erecting caissons on
the reefs, in dredging material from the seabed, and in depositing the dredged
material within the caissons without authorization constituted a trespass on government property. The government also contended that the defendants were engaged in
the erection of an artificial island on the Outer Continental Shelf without a permit
from the Secretary of the Army, which was in violation of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A., sec. 1333 (f) and 33 U.S.C.A., sec. 403.
Defendants in the main case filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b), and also answered the complaint with a general denial.
They also affirmatively asserted that the Secretary of the Army lacked jurisdiction
to require a permit for construction on the Outer Continental Shelf and that the
district court lacked jurisdiction since the reefs and the defendants' actions thereon
were outside of the territorial limits of the United States.
At this stage of the pleadings in the main case, Atlantis sought to intervene by
way of proposed answer and cross-claim against the defendants. Admitting the
jurisdiction of the district court, Atlantis asserted that the United States had no
territorial jurisdiction, dominion or ownership in or over the reefs, and that it
could not, therefore, maintain its action for injunctive relief, based as it was on
trespass. Atlantis further asserted that it had title to the reefs by virtue of discovery
and occupation, and, in connection therewith, the defendants were charged with
trespass in the cross-claim. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, without opinion, denied the motion to intervene, either as of
right or permissively, but granted Atlantis leave to appear amicus curiae. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 24(a) (2), as amended in 1966, 6 Atlantis could intervene as of
right.
The significance of this case is twofold. First, the Fifth Circuit used the new
rule 24 as the basis of its decision, even though the application for intervention
was filed in 1965 under the old rule 247 and even though the lower court properly
6. New FED. R. Civ. P. 24, as pertinent, provides: "(a) Intervention of
Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicants interest is adequately represented
by existing parties."
7. Old FED. R. Civ. P. 24, as pertinent, provides: "(a) Intervention of
Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action:

. . .

(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing

parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judghttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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disposed of the application according to the language of the old rule. The court
stated that "... [T]o the maximum extent possible, the amended Rules should
be given retroactive application."8 In the application of that principle to the main
case, several factors seemed significant. These were: that the main case had not
progressed past the pleading stage; that further action had been stayed pending
the appellate determination of the propriety of the application for intervention; and,
that the general aim of the federal rules is, "... to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" 9
Of primary significance is the interpretation given by the court to the language
of the new rule. In order to intervene as a matter of right under the old rule
24(a) (2), the applicant-intervenor had to show that he is or may be bound by a
judgment in the main case, and that his interests are or may be inadequately
represented by the parties therein. 10 It had been held, in an attempt to define
the concept embodied in the "bound" requirement under the old rule, that "In
conventional litigation, one is bound by a judgment in the action, within the
meaning of Rule 24(a), when the judgment is res judicata as to him.""1 This
technical approach proved of little assistance in the atypical case, however, and
so some courts developed a more realistic and utilitarian interpretation of the rule.
Reinforcing their practical approach by referring to the dictates of Federal Rule
1,12 these courts, by focusing on the "may be bound" language in the old rule
24(a), took more than a superficial look at the effect the judgment in the main
case might have on the rights of the applicant-intervenor.' 3 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, for instance, in allowing the three applicants to intervene
as a matter of right, said:
'[I]n
E. a very real sense (the applicant-intervenors) would be bound,
since obviously such a judgment' would determine the legal effectiveness
ment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody
or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.
"(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising

its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
8. Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d at 823 (emphasis
added).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 24, quoted note 7 supra.
11. Textile Workers Union of America v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767
(D.C. Cir. 1955); accord: Atlantic Refining Company v. Standard Oil Company,
304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, as pertinent, provides: "These rules

. . .

shall be

construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."
13. Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960), aff'd on other grounds
sub. nom. Janousek v. Wells, 303 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1962); Wolpe v. Poretsky,
144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944); Ford Motor
Company v. Bisanz Bros., Inc., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Textile Workers
Union of America v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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of the attacks against the state court order and judgment . . . and the
existence and propriety of defendants' acts . . . , and the result would

certainly establish an adverse precedent for the interveners. Damage would
have been done and undue prejudice may result . . . and the applicants

would be 'bound by the determinations therein in a very practical sense'
.. . and would 'gain or lose by direct legal operation of the judgment. ' 4
In its application of this doctrine of practicality and liberality to a later case,
the Eighth Circuit held that the applicant-intervenor was not entitled to intervene
as of right under old rule 24(a) (2). Although reaffirming the need for a practical
approach in interpreting the rule, the court took advantage of the opportunity
that this latter case presented and issued a warning as to the limits of its practical
approach, saying: "Liberality, however, does not equate with rights of indiscriminate
intervention. The applicant must still meet the requirement that he 'is or may be
bound' by the judgments. The consequences of adverse judgments in the main
actions are not nearly so evident here as they were in Kozak v. Wells. . ... 15
Further confusion as to the application and interpretation of the old rule
24(a) was brought about by the case of Sam Fox Publishing Co., Inc. v. United
States.'" This case was a federal antitrust proceeding against the association of
which the applicants for intervention were members. The association was charged
with antitrust violations with respect to its dealings with outsiders and also with
restraint of competition inter sese. The United States Supreme Court, in denying
the applicants their motion to intervene as of right in the inter sese portion of the
class action, pointed out that the judgment in a class action would be binding only
on those who had been adequately represented. Moreover, if one is bound in a class
action, then this of necessity means that he must have been adequately represented.
In either case, therefore, the applicant-intervenors would be unable to fulfill the two
requirements of being bound and being inadequately represented, both of which
must be met in order to intervene as of right under the old rule 24(a) (2). 17 The
Supreme Court in Sam Fox said that even though a court in subsequent case
might be inclined to use the decree in the former case as the foundation for its
decision,

"...

this effect is not at all equivalent to being legally bound, which

is what must be made out before a party may intervene as of right."' 8
Thereafter, some courts sought to give the Sam Fox decision a rather restricted and narrow application based on its particular facts, and in so doing they
were able to continue their approach of focusing on practical considerations."9
14. Kozak v. Wells, supra note 13.
15. Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.2d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
16. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. Sam Fox Publishing Co., Inc. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 694 (1961).
19. Atlantic Refining Company v. Standard Oil Company, 304 F.2d 387 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); International Mortgage & Investment Corporation v. Von Clemm, 301
F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962); Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.2d 912 (8th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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Other courts, however, would say that one must always show that he is or may
be "bound" by the judgment in the main case in a res judicata sense, thus extending the Sam Fox holding into the non-class action cases. 20
New rule 24(a), 21 as pointed out by the advisory committee, 22 is an attempt
to overcome the harshness of the Sam Fox rule with respect to intervention in class
actions. "A class member who claims that his 'representative' does not adequately
represent him

. . .

should not be put to the risk of having a judgment entered in

the action which by its terms extends to him, and be obliged to test the validity
of the judgment as applied to his interest by a later collateral attack." 23 The
new rule is also seen as a codification of the court-developed principle that the
practical effects of the judgment in the main case on the interests of the intervenor
are to be the matters of primary concern.2'
In its application of the new rule to the facts of Atlantis case, the court of
appeals pointed out that the real purpose of the main action was for the United
States to assert its exclusive dominion and control over two of the very islands
that intervenor had allegedly claimed as its own. Therefore, the court continued,
it could hardly be disputed that Atlantis ".

.

. claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject of the action." 25 The property at
stake in the main case (Triumph and Long Reefs) and the particular transaction
involved (the right to build structures on the reefs with or without the permission
of the Corps of Engineers) are identical with those of the intervention case.
Moreover, a successful defense of the main case requires a determination in favor
of the defendants on at least three basic issues, all of which are of fundamental
significance in Atlantis' claim against the Government. These issues are: (1)
whether the islands in question are "submerged lands" within the meaning of
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; 28 (2) if they are "submerged lands" under
that act, to what degree does the sovereignty of the United States extend to them
27
and to the particular activities thereon which the government's complaint alleges;
and, (3) whether the authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction to navigation in navigable waters of the United States extends to structures
on artificial islands other than those ".

.

. erected thereon for the purpose of

20. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 366 U.S. 129,
144 (1965) (Stewart and Harlan, JJ: dissenting); International Mortgage & Investment Company v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 865 (2d Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion).
21. See note 6 supra.
22. 39 F.R.D. 69, 109. Advisory Committee Notes.
23. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
24. "The amendment provides that an applicant is entitled to intervene in
an action when his position is comparable to that of a person under 19(a) (2) (i),
as amended, unless his interest is already adequately represented in the action by
existing parties. The Rule 19(a) (2) (i) criterion imports practical considerations,
and the deletion of the 'bound' language similarly frees the rule from undue preoccupation with strict considerations of res judicata." Ibid.
25. New FED. R. Crw. P. 24(a) (2), note 6 supra.
26. 43 U.S.C.A. 1331 et. seq.
27. 43 U.S.C.A. 1301(e), 1302 and 1333(a)(1).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom." 28 If
the defendants in the main case fail to successfully defend any or all of these
issues, then in a later suit between Atlantis and the United States, the principle of
stare decisis would operate to Atlantis' disadvantage. It follows, therefore, that
".... failure to allow Atlantis an opportunity to advance its own theories both of
law and fact in the trial (and appeal) of the pending case will, if the disposition
is favorable to the Government, 'as a practical matter impair or impede (its)
ability to protect (its) interest.' "29
To be entitled to intervene as a matter of right, however, the new rule also
requires, 0 as did the old rule,31 that the proposed intervenor show his interests to
be inadequately represented by existing parties. In explanation of its finding of
inadequate representation in the noted case, the court of appeals simply said that
it found ".... no difficulty here about the lack of representation, ' 32 and it reached
this conclusion before even identifying the inadequately represented interests. The
court felt the issue of inadequate representation so obviously undebatable that it
devoted only a half paragraph of its decision to the issue. Other courts, however,
might feel compelled to analyze the issue more thoroughly and, as a result, might
well arrive at a different result.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in Cascade Nat. Gas v. El Paso

Nat. Gas33 said:
The requirement of inadequate representation by existing parties as a precondition of the right to intervene under the new Rule 24 is obviously an
adaptation of the similar standard contained in the former 24(a) (2).
Decisions under that standard allowed intervention of right when the
intervenor could show a conflict of interest between himself and the party
supposed to represent his interest, a complete failure of representation by
existing parties, or collusion or the likelihood of collusion between them.
Mere tactical disagreement over how litigation should be conducted is
obviously insufficient to support intervention of right.34
Other grounds for validly asserting inadequate representation are bad faith, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of the duty of representation.3 5

28. 43 U.S.C.A. 1333(f) and 1333 (a) (1).
29. Atlantis Development Corporation v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828,
829 (5th Cir. 1967).
30. See note 6 s-upra.
31. See note 7 supra.
32. 379 F.2d at 825.
33. 386 U.S. 129, 155, 156 (1967).
34. Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953); Ford
Motor Company v. Bisanz Bros., Inc., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Kozak v. Wells,

278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960), af#'d on other grounds sub. norn. Janousek v. Wells,
303 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1962).

35. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); Stadin
v. Union Electric Company, supra note 34; 4 MooRE, FEmRL PRAcTcE, par. 24.08
(1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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Turning to the Atlantis opinion, one searches in vain for whatever reasons the
court of appeals had for reaching its conclusion that the defendant's defense of
the issues in the main case is or may be inadequate insofar as Atlantis' interests
are concerned. There is simply an expression by the court of a desire that Atlantis
should be able to advance its own theories of law and fact. There is no suggestion
that the defendants are unwilling or unable to actively defend the issues, but only
an emphasis on the finality of the decision in the main case on Atlantis' rights
through the operation of stare decisis. It has been held, however, that: "[T3he
mere fact that a particular decision is adverse to certain interests does not necessarily mean those interests were not adequately represented in the decision-making
36
process or in the decision itself."
The court of appeals did point out that Atlantis has two interests with respect
to the property in the main case. The one which is adverse to the United States
is the need for the successful defense against the government's allegations; this
has already been discussed. The other is an interest adverse to the defendants in
that Atlantis asserts ownership in the same reefs that defendants claim as their
own. It seems that it is this duality of interests, one being adverse to each party,
and this alone, which impelled the court to hold that representation of Atlantis'
interests was clearly inadequate in the noted case. It has been recently held, however, in an application of the new rule 24(a) (2) in a case similar to Atlantis
where the applicant-intervenor also had interests adverse to both the plaintiff and
the defendant that:
Though ... [intervenor] has a certain mutuality of interests with plaintiffs
, * it has not even been suggested that plaintiffs are inadequately representing that interest Furthermore, any interest [applicant-intervenor]
might have in common with defendant is being adequately defended...a3
While the court of appeals' holding that in Atlantis the operation of the
doctrine of stare decisis was equivalent to having one's ability to protect his
interests impaired or impeded is sound, and while this conclusion finds authority
both under the cases decided under the old rule and the language of the new rule,3 8
the opinion itself contains language which is dangerous and ambiguous. On its
face the decision indicates that the Court is disposed to give the new rule 24(a) (2)
language a liberal interpretation; but indications of a more restricted approach are
also present. The new rule requires only an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the main action;39 but this court would seem
36. Alleghaney Corporation v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1965).
37. Edmonson v. Nebraska, 383 F.2d 123, 127 (8th Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
38. Kozak v. Wells, supra note 14 and related text; FED. R. Cirv. P. 24(a) (2)
supra note 6; Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109; see also International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965) (involving stare decisis and intervention of
right although not under FED. R. Civ. P. 24); but see: Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.
v. Local No. 6167 et. al., 3 F.R.D. 251 (W.D. Va. 1943) (rejecting stare decisis as
good enough basis for fulfilling the "bound" requirement).
39. See note 6 supra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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to require ".... a conjunction of a claim to and interest in the very property and
the very transactionwhich is the subject of the main action." 40 Furthermore, the
court points out that the result in the present case "... does not presage one requiring intervention of right in every conceivable circumstance where under the operation
of the Circuit's stare decisis practice, the formidable nature of an en banc rehearing
or the successful grant of a writ of certiorari, an earlier decision might afford a substantial obstacle." 41 This language seems to be a step backward from the "bound as
a practical matter" test development under the old rule as exemplified by Kozak
v. Wells.4 2 It is also an indication that the presence or possibility of difficulty, even
great difficulty, in overcoming the effect of an earlier decision is not enough. 43
Couple with this the implication found in the beginning of the decision 44 that the
court of appeals was going to be more liberal than the Kozak court was and that it
disapproved of the holding in Stadin v. Union Electric,45 and one can only wonder
what this court's position is. The opinion seems to invite more litigation rather than
set forth clear guidelines such that in the future appeals will be kept to a
minimum.
It is likely that the Atlantis decision will not be relied on as a strong precedent
either by counsel or by the courts outside of the Fifth Circuit because: the court
did not cite any cases in support of its reasoning; it relied almost entirely for its
decision on new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 23, as amended in 1966,
relating to joinder of parties and to class actions respectively, as well as the Advisory Committee notes in explanation of these two rules; and, it relies on these
two rules and the notes thereto in the face of its own language that, "Although this
is question-begging and is therefore not a real test . . . the question of whether

an intervention as a matter of right exists often turns on the unstated question
of whether joinder of the intervenor was called for under new Rule 19." 4
In conclusion, it might be well to ask several pertinent questions not considered by the court of appeals. What, for instance, is the current status of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) (2),47 which issue this case clearly raises? What
merit is there to allowing Atlantis the right to introduce previously non-existent
issues into the main case (i.e. all issues of law and fact as to the propriety of its
claim to ownership by discovery)? How does the introduction of these issues help
in the ".

.

. just, speedy, and inexpensive determination ..."48 of the main case?

Why could the court of appeals not have achieved its desired result-allowing

40.
41.
42.
43.

379 F.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
Ibid.
278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960).
Accord: Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962),

cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
44. 379 F.2d at 822.
45. 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
46. Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 825 (5th Cir.

1967).
47. See note 7 supra.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, supra note 12.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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Atlantis~the opportunity to advance its own theories of law and fact-by merely affirming the lower court decision which would have permitted Atlantis to appear
amicus curiae? And, finally, what has happened to the discretion of the trial judge
on which the amended Rules 19, 23 and 24 were purportedly designed to rely?49
It is hoped that these and other questions will be taken into consideration by the
courts in their future treatment of cases dealing with intervention as of right, and
that a greater degree of clarity will result with respect to the meaning, the role,
and the application of the new rule 24.
J. WILLIAM CAMPBELL

DO CERTAIN VAGRANCY STATUTES MAKE THE STATUS OF
POVERTY A CRIME?
Parker v. Municipal Judge of the City of Las Vegasl

The defendants were convicted under the "disorderly persons" ordinance2
of the city of Las Vegas, Nevada. They appealed, and their conviction was reversed.
The specific acts of the defendants were not set forth in the opinion, as the
Supreme Court of Nevada addressed itself solely to the question of the constitutionality of the ordinance. The part of the ordinance under which the petitioners
were convicted made it a misdemeanor to "have the physical ability to work but
not having [sic] visible means of support." 3 The court held this provision unconstitutional on its face: "It is our judgment that it is unconstitutional since its
effect is to make the status of poverty a crime." 4
The Parker decision is indicative of the many controversies that have arisen
around statutes of this type. There is certainly no lack of treatment in legal
writings of the problems arising from "vagrancy" statutes. 5 In general, these laws
have been successfully attacked on their face 6 from two different approaches:
49. Cahn, The New Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J. 1204

(1966).
1. 427 P.2d 642 (Nev. 1967). [Hereinafter referred to as Parker.]

2. LAS VEGAS, NEv., CODE, Title VI, ch.1, sec. 11: "Disorderly Persons: Persons within the Limits of the City who have the physical ability to work, not
having visible means of support, living idly, or who are found loitering or loafing
about the streets, alleys or public places of the City ... shall be deemed disorderly

persons and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. Ibid.
4. Parker v. Municipal Judge of the City of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d 642, 643
(Nev. 1967).
5. The dissent in Parker went so far as to say: "The main attack on the
constitutionality of vagrancy statutes comes from legal writers rather than the
courts." 427 P.2d at 644. The reader is left to his own opinion as to the weight to be
given this argument for upholding vagrancy statutes.
6. This is an important classification. When a conviction is stricken because
a statute has been misapplied, the constitutional ramifications are not nearly so
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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(1) as a violation of due process for vagueness7 , and (2) for making a particular
status a crime.8 This note will discuss the holding in Parker and vagrancy statutes
generally. Then, the Missouri vagrancy statute will be considered in the light
of what is probably the existing constitutional law.
As with many other aspects of our legal system, vagrancy statutes find
their antecedents in the English common-law.' 0 The purposes of such laws have
changed, however, over the six hundred years they have been in use in the
Anglo-American legal system. Originally, the statutes were to force the idle to
work 1 l in a time when labor was scarce. Today, they are said to be used: to reach
the potential criminal,' 2 or the person found in a position suggestive of incipient
criminality,' 3 as a subterfuge to question those who the police would be otherwise
powerless to hold, 14 as an harassment measure, 15 or to "Banish Bums."1 6 The
legitimacy of these purposes is not the topic to be discussed here. It should be
noted, however, that there is certainly considerable controversy over the use of
7
vagrancy statutes, as well as their constitutional status.'
great as when the statute is held unconstitutional on its face. Holding a vagrancy
statute unconstitutional on its face means that the statute in question, and presumably any other similar statute, is no longer in effect. Whereas when a conviction is reversed because a vagrancy statute has been misapplied, the statute remains
in effect and only the particular conviction in question is struck down.
7. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), set forth the basic arguments that make
vague statutes unconstitutional. For vagrancy statutes attacked on vagueness
grounds (as a violation of 14th Amendment Due Process), see: Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953); State v. Caez, 81 N.J.Super. 315, 195 A.2d 496
(1963); Ex Parte Mittelstaedt, 163 Tex. Crim. 115, 297 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1957).
8. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941). Prescribing criminal sanctions on an unavoidable status comes
under the heading of "cruel and unusual punishment."
9. § 563.340, RSMo 1959.
10. 4 J. STrPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 308 (1883).
STATUTEs OF LABOURERS,

23 Edw. 3; 25 Edw. 3 Stat. I (1349).

11. STEPHEN, supra note 10.
12. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L.
Rrv. 1203, 1217-1218 (1953).
13. Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues, and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 557, 561 (1960).
14. Lacey, supra note 12.
15. Note, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 425 (1961). This note contains a survey and
summary of all the various uses which vagrancy statutes serve.
16. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.

603, 613 (1956).
17. Sherry, supra note 13; Lacey, supra note 12; Foote, supra note 16. The
abuses that can result from over-zealous applications of vagrancy laws are indicated

by the following quote from Foote, id., at 604-605:
On January 31, 1954, the Philadelphia press reported that police had
opened a drive against vagrants and habitual drunkards in the central city area." By February 2, the drive was at its height, and that
...

morning 56 cases were awaiting disposition when the magistrate opened
the daily divisional police court for the district which included the "skid
row" and the central city area. These cases were the last items on the
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Vagrancy-type statutes cover a wide variety of acts and states of being.' 8
The common-law definition of a vagrant was "an idle person, beggar, or -person
wandering without being able to give a good account of himself."'1 This has been
expanded in modem statutes to include approximately thirty different classifications
of vagrant.20 As in Parker, problems arise around the portions of the statutes that
make criminals of the "idle" and "those without visible means of support," i.e.
generally those who may be connected with a non-working status. Such provisions
will be referred to here under the broad heading of "vagrancy."
The Parker case represents an interesting departure from the usual attacks on
vagrancy statutes. It appears to be the first time such a statute has been struck
down because it made "status" a crime. 21 The usual approach has been to invalidate these laws because they were too vague to give the citizen fair warning, and
thus were violative of due process. While a vague statute may be saved by narrow
interpretations in the courts,2 2 when the actions at which the statute is aimed
cannot be made a crime, there is no way such a statute can be brought within the
constitution.
The United States Supreme Court addressed itself directly to the problem of
status crimes in Robinson v. California.23 There, a California statute24 made it a
misdemeanor 25 to be addicted to narcotics. The Supreme Court declared the statute
unconstitutional for applying "cruel and unusual punishment"'2 to the defendant
because of a status which the defendant may have had no power to avoid. No
criminal act was involved, but rather the "chronic condition of.. . being addicted to
morning's docket, and the magistrate did not reach them until 11:04 a.m.
In one of the cases there was a private prosecutor, and the hearing of
evidence consumed five minutes. As court adoujrned at 11:24, this left
15 minutes in which to hear the remaining 55 cases. During that time the
magistrate discharged 40 defendants and found 15 guilty and sentenced
them to three month terms in the House of Correction.
18. Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962).
19. Lacey, supra note 12, at 1207.
20. The Parker case was handed down in May of 1967. In November of
1967, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the same result in a similar situation. Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967). In that case, a defendant
was convicted under a statute that defined vagrants as "Idle persons who, not having visible means of support, live without lawful employment; . . ." MASs. GEN.
LAws ANN. Ch. 272, § 66 (1959). Another defendant in a companion case was found
guilty of being a tramp, or one who "moves about from place to place . . . living
without . . . visible means of support." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 272, § 63
(1959). Both of these convictions were reversed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court and both applicable sections of the Massachusetts Vagrancy Statute were
declared unconstitutional for making the status of poverty a crime. Research
indicates that, as of this date, the Nevada and Massachusetts Supreme Courts
are the only ones who have used this as a basis for striking down a vagrancy
statute. (The court also declared the statutory sections unconstitutionally vague.)
21. Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962), at 108-113.
22. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
23. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721.
25. Ibid. The statute imposed a 90 day sentence in the county jail.
26. 'Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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. . . narcotics." 2 7 The Nevada Supreme Court used this decision as one of the
authorities for their holding in Parker.28 The Nevada court declared that poverty
was the status being punished. Since the United States Supreme Court has stated
that a particular "status" cannot be made a crime,2 9 the central question becomes
whether "poverty" has generally been included, or can be included, in vagrancy
statutes as a punishable offense. The idea that mere "poverty" or "indigence" is
a criminally punishable offense is repugnant to the basic tenets of our legal system.30 It must then be determined if a certain vagrancy statute is so broad as to conceivably place poverty within its coverage; for if it does, that portion of the statute
that does include poverty is unconstitutional. 3 '
The Las Vegas ordinance made it a misdemeanor to "...
have the physical
ability to work ... no visible means of support.., and be in a public place... !"3 2
The condition of having no visible means of support is usually brought about by
being unemployed. As unemployment may lead to poverty, it is conceivable that
the status of indigence, when certain other conditions are present, would be punishable by this ordinance. From a logical standpoint then, the Nevada Supreme
Court is justified in its decision that the ordinance does make the status of poverty
a crime. The question remains whether there was sufficient legal precedent as a
33
basis for the court's holding in Parker.
The United States Supreme Court has never directed itself to the issue presented in Parker,although the court has had the opportunity to do so. In Hicks V.
District of Columbia,3 4 the defendant was arrested under the Washington, D.C.
vagrancy ordinance 35 for "play[ing] his guitar in Dupont Circle."3 6 The court of
appeals stated that the statute in question did not make the status of poverty a
crime.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,38 accepted briefs and heard oral
27. Robinson v. California, supra note 26, at 665.
28. 427 P.2d at 643.
29. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Recently, the Supreme Court
has again recognized that a "status" cannot be made a crime. Powell v. Texas, 88
S. Ct. 2145 (1968). In that case, appellant sought to attack a conviction under a
Texas statute (TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 477 (1952)) that made public drunkenness punishable by a fine. The appellant claimed to be a chronic alcoholic, unable
to avoid his "status" of drunkenness. The Supreme Court, while recognizing that a
continuing unavoidable status could not be made a crime, refused to call chronic
alcoholism a "status" within the meaning of Robinson. There was not enough evidence to prove that alcoholism in its chronic form was an involuntary situation, as
is drug addiction. Further, the court distinguished Robinson by saying the statute
there involved covered a continuing state of being, whereas the Texas statute in
Powel only applied to one act of drunkenness.
30. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
31. Edwards v. California, supra note 30.
32. See note 2, supra.
33. It is clear that the court declared the ordinance void on its face. The court
could not have said that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied because the
facts of the case were unreported. 427 P.2d at 643.
34. 383 U.S. 252 (1966).
35. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302 (3) (1961).
36. Hicks v.District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 259 (1966).
37. Hicks v.District of Columbia, 197 A.2d 154 (D.C.Ct. App. 1964).
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arguments on the point, but then decided that certiorari had been "improvidently
granted" and refused to decide the case. 39 In a later case, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia also rejected the Robinson idea of cruel and unusual
punishment as an attack on vagrancy statutesA0
The Supreme Court has never reversed a holding that a vagrancy statute is
unconstitutional for making the status of poverty a crime. Nor has the Court
specifically upheld a ruling that vagrancy statutes are constitutional. The lower
courts have split on the issue, so the question is presently unsolved. 41
The same confusion exists on the issue of vagueness. 42 Whether a particular
statute is unconstitutionally vague must be decided in light of the interpretations
the courts have given to that statute. A court may narrow a vague statute so as
to bring it within the concept of "fair-warning" as required by due process 43 This
means that a holding that a certain statute is unconstitutionally vague does not
amount to a holding that all similar statutes are unconstitutionally vague. All
that can be determined is what particular words, without the aid of later interpretive decisions, have been held to be too vague and which words have not. But even
this does not provide much useful information. For example, "loitering" is not an
unconstitutionally vague term,44 but "to loiter" or "loiter" is; 45 "Leading an immoral and profligate life" is not unconstitutionally vague,4 6 but "unreasonable
idleness" 47 is.
The United States Supreme Court followed the same course in Edelman v.
California4 that they followed in Hicks4" by artfully avoiding the issue presented.
Edelman argued that "dissolute" was an unconstitutionally vague term, and after
oral arguments, the court agreed that a serious constitutional question was raised. 0
But the court decided that the federal question had not been properly presented
and that, once again, certiorari had been improvidently granted. 51
38. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
39. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966).
40. Ricks v. U.S., 228 A.2d 316, 320-21 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
41. The F.B.I. Crime Reports for the year 1964 show that in 3,012 cities
with populations exceeding 2,500, 125,763 vagrancy arrests were made. Since
counsel is provided for indigents, and almost all vagrants are indigents, it is not
unlikely that each of these arrests that resulted in a conviction would have been
appealed if a holding by the Supreme Court indicated that most vagrancy
statutes were unconstitutional. The great amount of litigation such a holding
would produce may be one reason why the court has refused to examine vagrancy
statutes.
42. See cases cited note 7, supra.
43. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
44. Walker v. District of Columbia, 196 A.2d 92 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963).
45. Soles v. City of Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955). State
v. Caez, 81 N.J. Super. 315, 195 A.2d 496 (1963); Ex Parte Mittelstaedt, 297 S.W.2d
153 (Tex. Cr. App. 1957).
46. Ricks v. U.S., 228 A22d 316, 322 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
47. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950).
48. 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
49. 383 U.S. 252 (1966).
50. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358 (1953).
51. Id. at 362.
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Where does all this leave vagrancy statutes? The Supreme Court has refused
to speak on the issues of "status" and "vagueness" with respect to vagrancy
statutes. This means that at the present time, the state courts and lower federal
courts are free to choose whatever path they wish. It is clear that those paths may
be widely divergent. Thus, the Nevada court in Parker cannot be said to be
"wrong" in their decision. They have merely chosen a route as yet unexplored in
vagrancy litigation-that these laws make the status of poverty a crime. It is
important to note, however, that the trend of the most recent cases has been
to strike down vagrancy-type laws for one reason or another, 52 and the attacks on
53
the vagrancy statutes are growing.
The Missouri vagrancy law 54 reads as follows:
Every person who may be found loitering around houses of ill fame,
gambling houses, or places where liquors are sold or drank, without any
visible means of support, or shall attend or operate any gambling device
or apparatus, or be engaged in practicing any trick or device to procure
money or other thing of value, or shall be engaged in any unlawful calling
whatever, and every able-bodied married man who shall neglect or refuse
to provide for the support of his family, and every person found tramping
or wandering around from place to place without any visible means of
support, shall be deemed a vagrant, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail not less than twenty days,
or by fine not less than twenty dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
This statute has been in effect, substantially without change, since 1879.05 While
the Missouri Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the state statute's validity,58
similar city ordinances have been struck down. 57 This is interesting because the
court has said that in regard to vagrancy ordinances, "No municipality in the state
can lessen or broaden the state's definition [of vagrant]. " 5s If the definition cannot
be "lessened" or "broadened," it must necessarily be the same.
Of particular interest in this note is the section of the law that makes one
a vagrant who is "found tramping and wandering from place to place without any
visible means of support." It is this section of the law which gives rise to the
questions of the status of poverty being made a crime and of vagueness.
In Ex Parte Branch,"9 in 1911, the Missouri Supreme Court declared that the
52. See cases cited, notes 7, 8, and 44, supra.
53. This may be due, in part, to the fact that only recently have those convicted under vagrancy laws been provided the means to appeal. California and
Illinois have repealed their vagrancy statutes. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 35-1 (SmithHurd Supp. 1961); CAL. PEN. CODE § 647.
54. 563.340, RSMo 1959.
55. § 1568, RSMo 1879.
56. Ex Parte Branch, 234 Mo. 466, 137 S.W. 886 (1911); Ex Parte Karnstrom,
297 Mo. 384, 249 S.W. 595 (1923).
57. Ex Parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S.W. 457 (1920); Ex Parte Smith, 135
Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896); St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).
58. Ex Parte Taft, supra, note 57 at 551, 25 S.W. at 463.
59. 234 Mo. 466, 137 S.W. 886 (1911).
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state has the right to punish vagrants, the question remaining open as to just who
was a vagrant. Certainly, if the definition of a vagrant ties in with the status of
poverty, there is a serious question as to whether the state can punish vagrants.6 0
Another Missouri case considered this specific issue (punishing poverty) long
before it became a serious constitutional question. In Ex Parte Karnstrom,6 1 the
Missouri Supreme Court, in referring to the phrase "tramping and wandering
about without visible means of support,"6 2 said: "The act does not penalize mere
poverty, destitution or misfortune. Indeed, it says nothing whatever about poverty."6 3 Indeed, it does not; the phrase only mentions "tramping" and "wandering."
Later in the same paragraph,6 4 the court defined one of these terms: "Tramping
means moving about from place to place as a tramp or beggar." Add to this
definition the statutory phrase "without visible means of support," and it appears
that the only people who could qualify as vagrants are the poverty-stricken, the
destitute, and the unfortunate. Only in the sense that the word "poverty" does
not appear in the statute does the statute "say nothing ... about poverty."
Nevertheless, the terms of the statute do not punish all the poverty stricken,
but only those "[Tramps and beggars . . . who wander from place to place." The
poor who stay home have nothing to worry about.0 5 In City of St. Louis v. Gloner,6€
a St. Louis ordinance forbidding any person "to lounge, stand or loaf around" was
held unconstitutional as a violation of the "right of personal liberty. '6 7 The court
said: "Personal liberty ... consists of the right of locomotion." 68 A restriction on
locomotion, thus, was unconstitutional.6 9 This decision was based on Ex Parte
Smitlh,70 which held unconstitutional another section of the St. Louis vagrancy
ordinance that forbade association with persons having the reputation of being
thieves. The court in Smith also mentioned "locomotion" as being part of the
personal liberties. 71 As the above has indicated, a valid argument can be made
that the Missouri vagrancy statute operates to restrict the movement of certain
poor people. Why is this not also an unconstitutional invasion of "personal liberties"? The Missouri Supreme Court has used language that says certain restrictions
on locomotion are unconstitutional. The court has also defined the terms used in
60. See text at notes 10-54, supra.
61. 297 Mo. 384, 249 S.W. 595 (1923).
62. § 563.340 RSMo 1959.
63. .Ex Parte Karnstrom, 297 Mo. 384, 392, 249 S.W. 595, 597 (1923).
64. Id. "Wandering" was defined as "rambling here and there without any certain course."
65. An interesting equal protection argument could be interjected here, but
equal protection attacks on vagrancy laws have met with absolutely no success.
Karnstrom, id., is an example of this.
66. 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).
67. Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 4 (1875) [Now Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2].
68. Quoting from Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
69. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a "right to travel"
as being inherent in the rights of a citizen. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
70. 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896).
71. Id. at 226, 36 S.W. at 629.
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the Missouri vagrancy statute in such a manner that only the poor could come
within the statute's provisions. This leads to the interesting conclusion that, in the
cases upholding the Missouri vagrancy statute, the supreme court has used language
that all but declares the statute invalid.
There are indications, above, that the Missouri vagrancy law makes the status
of poverty a crime.72 Therefore, the Missouri Supreme Court would be justified
in following what appears to be the trend by striking down Missouri's vagrancy
law (or at least invalidating that portion of the statute under consideration here)
on this basis.
Concerning the void for vagueness attack on vagrancy statutes, the chief
Missouri case is Ex Parte Taft.7 3 There, the phrase "reasonable effort to work,"
as contained in the Kansas City vagrancy ordinance,74 was held to be too vague,
and thus, invalid.7 5 In the same decision the court declared that "without visible
means of support" was not so vague as to be invalid 7 In light of the United
States Supreme Court's ambivalence on the problem of vagueness in vagrancy
statutes, the Missouri court's determinations must necessarily be accepted as the
sole measure of what is and is not "vague." Thus, any attack for vagueness on
the Missouri statute would find little or no support in the case law. The Missouri
Supreme Court has not held any part of the Missouri vagrancy statute void because it is too vague, nor is there any present basis for such a holding to be found
77
in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The constitutional law relating to vagrancy statutes is in a state of confusion.
Determinations as to the validity of such laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
with no guiding standard forthcoming from the United States Supreme Court. Because of the frequent use of vagrancy laws by enforcement agencies, it is essential
that the constitutional status of these statutes be clarified.
72. See White, Legal Ambivalence Toward Poverty, 23 Mo. B.J. 289, 322
(1967), where it is stated:
Thus the law of vagrancy is illustrative of the historical fact that
poverty is associated with crime and immorality. This association, whether
justifiable or not (and certainly there is an historical basis for such association) cannot help but be extended to other areas of law dealing with
the poor and cannot but affect the attitudes of those persons administering
those other areas. The element of judgment and punishment and personal
fault so explicitly set forth in the proscription of vagrancy, is discernible
in other areas of law. It contributes to our society's ambivalence toward
poverty; for if poverty may be attributable, in any degree to personal sin
and degradation, then punishment is the historically corresponding remedial procedure. If poverty is associated with personal sin and fault will
this attitude not have an effect upon the content of any program for the
relief of the poor, at the level of the case worker, the administrator, the
jurist and the legislator?
73. 284 Mo. 531, 225 S.W. 457 (1920).
74. KANSAS Crry, Mo., ORDINANCES, No. 33205 § 1 (1918). The ordinance declared certain persons who did not make a reasonable effort to work to be vagrants.
75. 284 Mo. at 547, 225. S.W. at 461.
76. 284 Mo. at 544, 225. S.W. at 461.
77. See text at notes 10-54, supra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7

16

et al.: Recent Cases
1968]

RECENT CASES

The Missouri vagrancy statute is of questionable validity. A strong argument
can be made that it makes the status of poverty a crime. However, an attack on
the law on this basis or on the basis of being void for vagueness would probably
have little success because of the lack of authority in the area.
THOMAs

L.

PATrEN

AGENCY-LIABILITY OF NATIONAL ADVERTISER TO THIRD
PERSONS DEALING WITH LOCAL SERVICE AGENTS
Crowe v. Hertz Corp.'
Donald Cox was vacationing in Nassau, Bahamas, when he and two friends
decided to rent a car. They went to a desk at the Sheraton British Colonial Hotel
above which was displayed a large sign, "Hertz Rent A Car." The car was rented
at the "with insurance" rate from the man at the desk who wore a shirt with a
"Herz" insignia on it; the printed form rental agreement was identical to those
issued at Hertz offices in the United States. Cox later met Sara Crowe whom he
invited to go for a drive. As the two of them were riding together, they were
involved in a head on collision in which Miss Crowe, the passenger, was seriously
injured. After the accident, the car was towed to and stored in a fenced lot bearing
a "Hertz" sign of the same type used by the Hertz Corporation in its advertising
in the United States. Subsequently an examination of the insurance policy revealed
that the insurance coverage on the car excluded protection of the driver against
liability claims of passengers.
Sara Crowe then commenced this action, joining Cox and Hertz Corporation
as defendants. Cox denied liability and filed a third party claim against Hertz
Corporation. Crowe's claim and Cox's cross-claim against Hertz were made on the
same grounds. Cox's cross-claim against Hertz Corporation is of particular interest
in this note because Cox was the driver-renter of the car. This is the usual situation
from which a case such as this would be expected to arise; Crowe's claim is more
remote as it would be difficult to prove reliance on Hertz advertising or any privity
with local Rent-A-Car. Cox's complaint alleged that he relied on representations
made by Hertz in its "continuous and saturation-type" advertising where it held
itself out as providing rent-a-car service throughout the world and that this service
included furnishing the highest standard of insurance coverage. Such advertisements appeared in Time magazine during the years 1956-64 and stated that:
"Hertz rates include everything, gas, oil, and proper insurance"; Hertz has offices
throughout the United States and in thirty-one foreign countries; "wherever you are,
wherever you are going, there is a Hertz office nearby to serve you"; 2 "Rental fees
1. 382 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1967).
2. Crowe v.Hertz Corp., 382 F.2d 681, 682-686 (5th Cir. 1967).
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include . . . public liability, property damage, fire and theft insurance, and $100
deductible collision protection."; and insurance coverage is of the highest standards
(Hertz Corp. annual report).3 Hertz, on the other hand, was able to show by
an affidavit from one Reiter, a Hertz vice president, that all operations outside the
United States are carried on by its subsidiary Hertz American Express International,
Ltd. (51 per cent owned by Hertz) and that Hertz Corporation had no direct
connections with the company in the Bahamas that rented cars under the Hertz
name (hereafter called local Rent-A-Car). The trial court 4 granted a summary
judgment dismissing both complaints against Hertz, finding that "Hertz Corporation was not doing business in Nassau, Bahamas" on the date of the accident, that
local Rent-A-Car was not an agent or representative of Hertz Corporation, and
that Hertz Corporation "has no knowledge of and did not participate in the
. . . renting of the car." 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's holding. In light of the summary judgment below, the court of appeals
turned its attention to the complaint. This complaint, by the court's interpretation,
was based on the assumption: that "every person reading and relying upon the
Hertz advertising is warranted in accepting as true the statement that wherever
a 'Hertz' car is rented worldwide, the person relying upon such advertising is
guaranteed that the highest standard of insurance protection is offered"; that "in
this case of defendant Hertz Corporation, whether or not acting through its agent
in the ,z, ual sense nevertheless provided through its subsidiary corporation for the
renting to Cox of a 'Hertz' car. ... "0
The court of appeals' explanation of what constitutes a cause of action in this
case is not altogether clear. It appears that the complaint first states a cause of
action for misrepresentation by which Cox was induced to rent a Hertz car believing it had proper insurance. With respect to this cause of action, the court of
appeal says, "We think it plain that the presence or absence of the Hertz Corporation in the Bahama Islands at the time this automobile was rented . . . is irrelevant
to the cause of action asserted. . . ." Thus, the Fifth Circuit seems to give some
support to the existence of a cause of action independent of the existence of any
relationship between Hertz Corporation and local Rent-A-Car.
Another separate cause of action also appears to exist in the complaint. It
is: that local Rent-A-Car was Hertz Corporation's agent, and through local RentA-Car the defendant provided a car without the high standard of insurance coverage represented in "Hertz" advertising. The court of appeals defines the form of
this (agency) relationship in several ways, including: "by whatever arrangement,
it [Hertz Corporation] permitted its subsidiary to in turn license a local operator.
3. Id. at 684.
4. United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (unreported).
5. Crowe v. Hertz Corp., 382 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting from the
summary judgment record.
6. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 687.
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. . ."8 The trial court had summarily dismissed the complaint on a finding that
there was no actual agency relationship between Hertz Corporation and local RentA-Car. The court of appeals, in reversing, said, "[Wie conclude that the trial
court dealt too summarily with the question of agency...
" The trial court had
overlooked the possibility that "agency by estoppel," "apparent agency," or implied authority could also form the crucial link of responsibility between Hertz
Corporation and local Rent-A-Car.' 0
Thus, it appears from the court of appeals' decision that there may be two
theories upon which Cox might recover against Hertz Corporation: (1) pure
misrepresentation where the wrong committed by Hertz Corporation must have
been in inducing Cox to rent a "Hertz" car believing that there would be the highest
standard of liability coverage; (2) providing a rental car through Hertz Corporation's agent, local Rent-A-Car and misrepresenting the amount of liability insurance that car would have. On their face, these two theories of action may be
difficult to distinguish; but the real difference between them is significant.
Under the first theory, Hertz Corporation would be liable to Cox without
showing any connection between Hertz Corporation and local Rent-A-Car. This
would mean that any time someone rents a car from what appears to be a
"Hertz" agency, defendant corporation could be held legally responsible for any
damage that might ensue through reliance on "Hertz" advertising. Such would be
the result even if Hertz Corporation did not know the local car rental business
even existed. In other words, the defendant could be held liable for acts that
contravene its advertising representations by even an impostor who displays a
"Hertz" sign. It is submitted that this would be a dangerous extension of liability
for misrepresentation l for which the Fifth Circuit cites no authority, and for which

8. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). See also the definition in the text at note
6 supra.
9. Id. at 687 (emphasis added). The court of appeals felt that the trial
court had erred in basing its conclusion that no agency existed merely on the
statement by Reiter that local Rent-A-Car was not Hertz Corporation's agent and
by confining its consideration of the existence of an agency relationship to that of
actual agency. With reference to Reiter's statement, the court said, "It would be
tantamount to a rule that if Party A swears he was not negligent, then Party B
could not prove A's negligence by circumstantial evidence." 1d. at 688.
10. Id. at 688. The court cites Piedmont Operating Co. v. Cummings, 40
Ga. App. 397, 149 S.E. 814 (1929), in support of these agency theories. "Agency by
estoppel" and "apparent agency" are usually termed estoppel and apparent authority by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY.
11. The court of appeals cites Hines v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888, 139 S.E. 802
(1927), in reference to an action for misrepresentation. This case holds that representations made to the public at large with intent to influence them are actionable without showing intent to defraud any particular person. It is applicable to
Hertz for this much. The cases are different, however, in that Hines contained the
additional element of intent to deceive; it is highly doubtful that in Hertz it could
be shown that Hertz possessed the requisite intent to deceive necessary to sustain
an action for fraud. See Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d
483 (Mo. En Banc 1966), discussing the elements of fraud in Missouri. This problem is discussed further at note 27 infra.
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this writer has found none. It should be noted that the reversal by the court of
appeals in this case was not dependent on a holding that the lower court had
erred in not considering the pure misrepresentation theory; the error assigned was
a misapplication of agency principles. A ruling based on the pure misrepresentation
theory would make a national advertiser responsible for the acts of others over
which he has no knowledge or control and could result in serious limitations on
advertising activity.
The second theory of action would require proof of some agency relationship
between Hertz Corporation and local Rent-A-Car, as well as showing some reliance by plaintiff on defendant's advertising. In other words, Hertz Corporation
advertised that its cars had the highest standard of liability insurance, but nevertheless provided a car through its agent local Rent-A-Car without the insurance
coverage advertised. It follows that defendant corporation would -not be responsible
under this second theory of action for damages arising out of the rental of cars
by businesses displaying "Hertz" signs of which Hertz Corporation has no knowledge; in such a case defendant would not have "provided" a rental car.
The second theory of action, which would require proof of an agency relationship between Hertz Corporation and local Rent-A-Car, seems to be the sounder
of the two theories in the court of appeals decision. Therefore, the remainder of
this note deals with what this writer believes is a workable approach to the problem of what elements will constitute a cause of action in Hertz and similar cases.
This approach is based on the second theory of action stated above.
Third persons who deal with local service12 concerns, may seek to hold a
national advertiser liable for damage resulting from the local service on the basis
of representations made in advertising. In so doing, it is suggested that the third
person should approach the problem of proving his case in two steps. First, he
must show some basis (or cause of action) on which the national advertiser should
be held accountable for his actions. Second, he must show some connection between
the national advertiser and the person he dealt with on the local level.
There are several possible theories on which the first step can be established;
although a thorough discussion of them is beyond the scope of this note, the
12. A distinction must be made between cases where service is rendered and
products-liability cases. Strict liability based on implied warranties by producers
of consumer products has developed far more rapidly than in other areas such as
where a national corporation advertises and sells service rather than tangible
products. In the service area, liability cannot be so readily extended to ultimate
consumers irrespective of privity as it often is with consumer products. See Prosser,
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Y.A. LJ. 1099
(1960); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459 (1967), and 33 Mo. L.
REv. 24 (1968); Roberts, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rule and Strict Liability-The Non-food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962). See also Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d
112 (1961), and Comment, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 236 (1959), which both suggest
that privity requirements may be relaxed where personal injury or property damage is involved. The emerging products liability doctrines are discussed in Miller,
Labels and Advertisements that Lead to Liability, A.BA. SECr. ON INS., NEGL. AND
CoMp. LAw, 198 (1966). The problem of warranties on consumer products is discussed further in notes 24 and 31 infra.
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following are suggested. The doctrine of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais,18
can be used advantageously in connection1 4 with an action on the contract 1 5 For
example, the term "with insurance" in the rental agreement in Hertz is ambiguous' 0
and susceptible to explanation by parol evidence.' 7 Hertz Corporation made representations of a material fact,' 8 though not knowingly false,' 9 that they intended
13. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 -ARv. L. REv. 415
(1911), explains the use of estoppel in a cause of action. Estoppel has been confused as being merely a rule of evidence, however, "[An estoppel, like a conclusive
presumption, is a rule of substantive law masquerading as a rule of evidence ....
An estoppel then may be, and frequently is, either the sole or the main foundation
of a cause of action." Williston, supra at 425. See note 14 infra for the general rule
which is contra to that stated above.
The terms equitable estoppel and estoppel in pais are used interchangeably.
Emery v. Brown Shoe Co., 287 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1956). The terms equitable estoppel and estoppel in pais are applicable to all estoppels not of record or by deed.
Sidney Weber, Inc. v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 205 S.W.2d 291 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1947).
14. Estoppel is generally considered not to be a cause of action which, by
itself, can be used for the benefit or gain of the plaintiff; rather it is used only to
protect the plaintiff from loss that would otherwise be unavoidable. Emery v.
Brown Shoe Co., 287 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1956). While estoppel is usually used as a
defense, it can be the "hinge pin" of a plaintiff's case for misrepresentation. "The
plaintiff prevails, not on the theory that the defendant's misrepresentation is tortious in itself, but because the defendant is not allowed to assert the truth which
would otherwise be a defense to some other action." W. PROSSER, TORTS § 100 at
706 (3rd ed. 1964). When estoppel is an element of a cause of action it must be
pleaded. E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Lowrey, 276 S.W.2d 636 (Spr. Mo. App.
1955). It must also be pleaded when used as an affirmative defense. § 509.090,
RSMo 1959.
15. Innocent misrepresentations inducing the making of a contract are often
called "legal fraud" and one may be estopped to deny that the facts relating to the
contract are different from his representations. 17 C.J.S., Contracts §§ 147, 152
(1963). Innocent misrepresentations of a material fact may also be grounds for
rescission, although it is not an entirely appropriate remedy in the Hertz case.
Hudspeth v. Zorn, 292 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1956); RESTATEMENT OF Co'miCTs §§
470, 476 (1932).
16. While the "with insurance" term of the contract is ambiguous, the advertisement (representation) used to raise the estoppel cannot be ambiguous or subject to several constructions according to the rule set forth in Noell v. Remmert,
326 Mo. 148, 30 S.W.2d 1009 (1930).
17. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1955), on the admissibility of advertising
material as containing admissions of a litigant contrary to the position taken by
him. See also Housden v. Berns, 273 S.W.2d 794 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954), where an
advertising brochure entitled "Trailer Coach Guide" was admitted in evidence
in a suit to rescind a contract for the purchase of a trailer; and, Davidson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Il. App. 355 (1912).
18. Representations must be as to material facts. Legler v. Meriwether, 391
S.W.2d 599 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965). A material fact is a fact to which a reasonable
man would attach importance. The misrepresentation of that material fact need
not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's damage; it is enough that it play a substantial part in influencing the plaintiff to act. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 103 (3rd ed.
1964).
19. Intent to deceive is not necessary to raise estoppel. Lange v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 254 Mo. 488, 162 S.W. 589 (1913). Missouri, however, apparently
does require that the defendant ought to have known the true facts. Rodgers v.
Seidlitz Paint and Varnish Co., 404 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1966); Fulton v. Kansas City
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would induce reliance by third persons. 20 Cox reasonably relied thereon, not knowing the falsity of the advertisement, 21 and changed his position to his detriment. 22
In these facts, all of the elements of estoppe 23 are present Hertz Corporation
could be estopped to deny that "with insurance" meant other than with the
highest standard of insurance as advertised. Likewise, the advertisements could
be characterized as creating a warranty of adequate insurance 24 that Hertz
Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App. 78, 148 S.W.2d 581 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941). In other
words, negligence in making a statement (by not knowing the facts one ought to
know), is usually requisite to raising estoppel. Kind v. Staton, 409 S.W.2d 253 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966). In some jurisdictions, estoppel will operate on entirely innocent
and honest misrepresentations. Dill v. Widman, 413 Ill. 448, 109 N.E.2d 765
(1952); RESTATEMtNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894, comment b (1964). The distinction between innocent and negligent misrepresentation will be of little consequence
in most cases, though, because the defendant usually ought to know what he says
is true and is negligent for not finding the true facts before speaking.
20. Representations must be made with intent that they be relied upon;
otherwise there would be no basis on which to allocate fault and estop one party
to a transaction from denying the truth of his representations. Long v. Robinson,
222 Mo. App. 503, 281 S.W. 78 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
21. Reliance by the plaintiff forms the causal connection between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's damage. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 103
(3rd ed. 1964). Hence, reliance is an essential element for estoppel and must be
proved. Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 315 Mo. 849, 288 S.W. 359
(1926); De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936). In De Gouveia, supra, the plaintiff's case failed because
he was unable to prove that a three week old newspaper advertisement had anything to do with his subsequent act (purchase) made in alleged reliance. Likewise,
the plaintiff's reliance must have been reasonable; this is especially true where the
plaintiff lacks equal facilities to learn facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the
speaker. Scheeter v. Brewer, 344 S.W.2d 784 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961); W. PROSSER,
supra § 103. For example, an advertisement on a bread wrapper that the bread is
pure and made under ideal conditions by expert bakers could not be reasonably
construed to represent that by no accident could any foreign substance be in a
loaf of bread. Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N.E. 553 (1923).
22. The change of position necessary to raise estoppel is defined as some
definite act in reliance on the representations of the other party by which the
plaintiff would suffer a detriment (damage) if the estoppel were not permitted.
State on inf. McKittrick ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339
Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607 (1936); Kind v. Staton, 409 S.W.2d 253 (K.C. Mo. App.
1966).
23. Rodgers v. Seidlitz Paint and Varnish Co., 404 S.W.2d 191, 195-196 (Mo.
1966), contains a recent Missouri enumeration of the elements of equitable estoppel.
24. Advertisements have been found to create express warranties. The usual
situation has been in the advertisement of consumer products where strict liability
has been imposed and proof of negligence is unnecessary. Privity of contract between the advertiser and ultimate consumer is also unnecessary. 1 S. WILLISTON,
SALES § 237 (3rd ed. 1948); Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or
Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REV. 733 (1929); Comment, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 236 (1959).
See, e.g., Bachman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939),
advertisement stating that car had collision-proof seamless top held to be an express warranty; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St 244, 4 Ohio
Ops.2d 291, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958), and Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 112 (1958), holding
that an advertisement that the product was safe and harmless was a warranty, the
advertisement having induced the sale; Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo.
1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945), and Annots., 158 A.L.R. 1402 (1945), 75 A.L.R.2d
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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Corporation would be estopped to deny; this is similar to the contract action
described above.25 In some jurisdictions, the remedy of reformation and action on
the reformed contract is available where the making of a contract was induced by
7
(as dismisrepresentation. 28 Also, a tort action for negligent misrepresentation
112, 129 (1961), where a ladder was advertised, holding that all the facts and circumstances including the wording of the advertisement and seller's talk must be
considered in determining what the warranty is. There has been a tendency in
some jurisdictions to restrict recovery based on warranty without privity (especially implied warranties of fitness) to food and drug products. Missouri has moved
away from this limitation, stating that Missouri courts need not be bound by it
were justice so requires. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 52
(Mo. En Banc 1963). See 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (ref. ed. 1948, 1959 Supp.);
Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459 (1967), and Roberts, Implied
Warranties and Strict Liability-The Non-food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REV. 194 (1962).
In cases where express warranties are created by advertising, the problem of lack
of privity is more easily overcome. Advertisers owe a duty of care to the public,
and the representations made by them can be regarded as express warranties made
directly to the members of the public, irrespective of contractual relationships.
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952);
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Bairdon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934); Freeman
v. Navarre, 47 Wash.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
The significance of any privity of contract problems in the Hertz case is greatly
diminished because if local Rent-A-Car is proved to be an agent of Hertz Corporation, any contract made with local Rent-A-Car is really a contract directly with
Hertz Corporation. It should also be noted that the cases cited above deal with
warranties of products-none warrant service. While this distinction may be significant in the case of implied warranties which are usually limited to products
liability, it should have no bearing on express warranties. Advertisements are express warranties made directly to the public and should be actionable whether they
comprehend products, service, or insurance protection.
25. At first, warranty was viewed as an action in tort; today it has come to
be viewed as an action in contract. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (ref. ed. 1948, 1959
Supp.); W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 100 (3rd ed. 1964).
26. This is the position taken by RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 491 (1932).
Where a written contract... owing to fraud or [innocent] misrepresentation of one party and the mistake of the other, fails to express the agreement which they had manifested an intent that the writing should express,
the latter can get a decree of reformation of the writing, unless precluded
by the Statute of Frauds.
Missouri, however, is reluctant to grant reformation in the case of misrepresentation, if at all, or even fraud. Long v. Greene County Abstract & Loan Co., 252 Mo.
158, 158 S.W. 305 (1913), held that contracts would not be reformed where induced by fraud, but only cancelled. When reformation has been allowed where
fraud was involved, the fraud had to be coupled with a mistake and the mistake
had to be mutual. Russell v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 66 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1933),
applying Missouri law; Allan v. Allan, 364 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1963); Commercial
Std. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 248 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1957). A recent Missouri
appeals case, takes a step away from the limited doctrine above, saying that
reformation may be granted in "clear case of fraud." Thomburgh v. Warson Village Corp., 331 S.W.2d 144, 146 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960). It is apparent, however,
that reformation in Missouri does not yet comprehend the innocent or negligent
misrepresentation present in the Hertz case. Of course, innocent misrepresentation
is grounds for rescission, although it is not entirely appropriate in Hertz. Hudspeth
v. Zorn, 292 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1956).
27. The tort action for misrepresentation developed out of the common law
actions for fraud and deceit, both of which carried with them the requirement of
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tinguished from fraud where intent to deceive must be shown) may be used in
those jurisdictions that recognize this cause of action. 28 In addition, the existence
of statutes prohibiting false advertising 29 could possibly be applied to make advertising misrepresentations in violation thereof negligence per se. 0
some attendant conscious dishonesty or intent to mislead. Williston, Liability for
Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415 (1911). Misrepresentation had
been early recognized in England as a basis for relief in equity. 3 J. PoMERoY,
EQurr, JURISPRUDENCE § 888 (5th ed. 1941). American courts began to make a
distinction between misrepresentations made with intent to deceive and those made
negligently. Cunningham v. C. R. Please House Furnishing Co., 74 N.H. 435, 69
At. 120 (1908). Today, the law of misrepresentation is far broader than fraud or
deceit, covering negligent and sometimes innocent statements. W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 100 (3rd ed. 1964). While in some jurisdictions the terminology may be somewhat
obscure by intermingling "fraud," "deceit," and "misrepresentation," the real issue
remains the same: "when a defendant has induced another to act by representations
false in fact, though not dishonestly made, and damage has directly resulted from
the action taken, who should bear the loss?" Prosser, Misrepresentationand Third
Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 236 (1966). In fact, misrepresentation is often erroneously classified as fraud or deceit, the only real difference being in the element of
intent. There are several leading cases in the misrepresentation area that are
worthy of noting: Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) and
Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1139 (1931), recognizing that misrepresentations need not be
made to particular plaintiffs but that liability extends only to those whose reliance would be reasonably forseeable; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456,
12 P.2d 409 (1932), where an advertisement that windshields were shatterproof
led to liability for misrepresentation when plaintiff was injured due to a small
rock shattering said windshield; Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn.
1966), Ford liable on basis of negligent misrepresentation in advertising. Compare
Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), where a
cigarette advertiser was held liable for knowingly misrepresenting that cigarettes
were harmless to the respiratory system.
28. Missouri does not recognize an action for negligent or innocent misrepresentation, a position which has long been maintained. E.g., Jolliffe v. Collins, 21
Mo. 338 (1855); Redpath v. Lawrence, 42 Mo. App. 101 (K.C. Ct. App. 1890);
Statton v. Dudding, 164 Mo. App. 22, 147 S.W. 516 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912). The
fraud action, however, has been extended slightly in recent years to include liability
for statements made recklessly. Ackmann v. Keeney Toelle Real Est. Co., 401
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Smith v. Tracy, 372 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1963).
This may, in effect, be saying that statements made with conscious ignorance of
the truth show a lack of good faith and are, for that reason, actionable fraud.
Powers v. Shore, 248 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1952). Of course, if it could be shown
in Hertz that Hertz Corp. made representations as to insurance coverage without
knowledge of their truth or falsity, this might enable plaintiffs to proceed in an
action for fraud.
29. § 561.660, RSMo 1959 provides that any person who shall publish with
"intent to sell . . . services . . . [or] intent to induce the public to increase consumption . . . any assertion, representation, or statement of fact which is untrue,

deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This section has not
been interpreted by the courts as to whether it requires specific intent that the
representations made be false or misleading. If proof of specific intent were required, the use of the statute for negligence per se purposes would be greatly
attenuated because, in effect, false advertising with intent to mislead is equivalent
to fraud. Therefore, one would be just as well to bring an action for fraud. See
Note, 33 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 144 (1958), discussing a New York statute similar to
§ 561.660, RSMo 1959 which was construed not to require specific intent to mislead. Other relevant statutes are §§ 375.306, 375.396, RSMo 1959.
30. The doctrine of negligence per se has been applied infrequently, if at all,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/7
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Under the theory of this note, the second step in establishing the liability of
a national advertiser is equally as essential as the first. Where what is advertised
and sold is service, rather than consumer products, it is highly doubtful that the
national advertiser can be said to have warranted the service he advertises irrespective of privity with the ultimate consumer. In other words, the national
advertiser of service represents only that the service he or his agents provide
will conform with what was advertised. He does not warrant the same kind of
service provided by just anyone who hangs up a sign bearing the national advertiser's name.3 1 Similarly, unless Hertz Corporation can be shown to have some
affiliation with local Rent-A-Car in the Bahamas, its liability to those who deal
with local Rent-A-Car (Cox) cannot be made out. The degree of affiliation that need
be shown is the existence of an agency relationship;32 if this is shown, third perto cases of misrepresentation by advertising. In Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244
F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957), defendant published an advertisement representing that
Arrid deodorant was "safe, harmless" and "does not irritate the skin." In remanding, the court suggested that violation of a false advertising statute could be a
basis for civil liability since the plaintiff was in the class of persons for whose
protection the statute was enacted. The law on negligence per se in Missouri is
fairly well settled. The violation of a statute or ordinance enacted to protect the
class of persons of which plaintiff is a member and to prevent the type of injury
plaintiff suffered, and the violation of which is the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury, is negligence per se. Grimes v. Standard Oil Co., 370 S.W.2d 627 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1963); Downing v. Dixon, 313 S.W.2d 644 (1958); Albright v. Louisiana &
M.R.R. Co., 355 Mo. 211, 195 S.W.2d 648 (1946). Once the violation of the statute
and proximate cause have been shown, the person charged with negligence per se
has the burden of proof to excuse his illegal act. Beezley v. Spiva, 313 S.W.2d 691
(1958). The fact situation in Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S.W. 635
(K.C. Ct. App. 1919), bears some similarity to the Hertz case. There the sale of an
article was prohibited by law unless first inspected. A remote vendor was held
liable to an ultimate consumer because the statute in question was enacted for the
benefit of the ultimate consumer.
31. The reason a distinction between service and consumer products need be
made is fairly clear. When consumer products leave the factory of the producer,
they are the same as they will be when they come into the hands of the ultimate
consumer, regardless of how many middlemen there are between manufacturer
and ultimate consumer. On the other hand, service is performed locally, and unless
the national advertiser has some control over, or at least knowledge of, the local
operation, it cannot be held responsible for the local serviceman's activities. See
notes 12 and 24 supra for cases and authorities.
32. The reason for requiring an agency relationship is not for the imposition
of vicarious liability on the principal for some tort or misconduct of the agent,
for that would require the existence of some extra degree of controll requisite to a
master-servant relationship. However, where the agent is acting within (at least)
his apparent authority to make representations for the principal, the principal will
be bound as if he had made the representations himself, regardless of any tort
liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 250, 257 (1958). Nonetheless, it
must be borne in mind that neither of the above principles is sought to be the
basis for Hertz Corporation's liability. Rather, the situation should be characterized
as follows: Hertz Corporation made representations to third persons on which
they relied and subsequently dealt with Hertz Corporation through its agents,
and the third persons now seek to hold Hertz Corporation to the truth of its representations.
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sons dealing with local agents are, in law, dealing with the principal88 who made
the advertising representations in the first place.
In Hertz and similar cases, it is doubtful that any express grant of authority
to the local concern could be proved since the burden of proving the existence of
the agency' relationship is on the person alleging it.3 Usually, this burden will
fall upon the third person who, even with the use of modem discovery devices,
would find it difficult to prove that any express grant of authority was given. s5
Therefore, any attempt to show the existence of an actual agency relationship
would rest, most practically, on the theory of implied authority. While implied
authority requires a manifestation by the principal to the agent that the principal
consents to the agent acting for him, such consent may be by "written words or
conduct which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him to act on the principal's account."30 Hence, if it could be shown
that Hertz Corporation was responsible for placing local Rent-A-Car in business,
implied authority to make car rental contracts might be inferred. It is more likely,
however, that, because of the intervening subsidiary Hertz American Express International, Ltd., implied authority could best be proved by the course of dealing
between principal and agent,37 or by Hertz Corporation's knowing acquiescence in
local Rent-A-Car's activities.38 The dealings between Hertz Corporation and local
Hertz relating to making car reservations in the Bahamas through the corporation's
New York reservation office might be sufficient to create implied authority. At
33. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958). Therefore, the two
parties to the car rental contract made in the Bahamas would be Cox and Hertz
Corporation, enabling Cox to sue Hertz Corporation directly on the contract.
34. Martin v. Mercantile Trust Co., 293 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. 1956); Leidy v.
Taliaferro, 364 Mo. 191, 260 S.W.2d 504 (1953).
35. It must be remembered that this is exactly what the principal is denying,
so short of finding a written authorization or an admission by some officer of the
principal, the third person will fail in his proof of agency expressly created. Also,
the acts, declarations or admissions of the purported agent are insufficient in themselves to prove agency. Rosser v. Standard Milling Co., 312 S.W.2d 106 (Mo.
1958).
36. Roy v. Tinsley, 355 S.W.2d 621, 625-626 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962). This consent ". . . rests in the intention of the parties which may be express or implied, and
need not be a conscious intention .. ." Lamer-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266

S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo. 1954). "Implied authority is actual authority of which direct
proof is lacking, but which is to be implied or inferred from relevant facts and
circumstances in the case." Wyler Watch Agency v. Hooker, 280 S.W.2d 849, 854
(Spr. Mo. App. 1955). See also Farm and Home Savings and Loan Ass'n. of Mo. v.
Stubbs, 231 Mo. App. 87, 98 S.W.2d 320 (K.C. Ct App. 1936); Housden v. Berns,
241 Mo. App. 1163, 273 S.W.2d 794 (Spr. Ct. App. 1954); and, Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
1027 (1955), discussing the admissibility of advertising material as containing
admissions of a litigant.
37. Vance v. Stout's Turkey Hatchery, Inc., 359 S.W.2d 247 (Spr. Mo. App.
1962); Roy v. Tinsley, 355 S.W.2d 621 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962); Thomhill v. Masucci,

202 Mo. App. 357, 216 S.W. 819 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919).

38. The principal cannot be held to have acquiesced in the agent's exercise
of authority unless he actually knew or should have known of it. Farm and Home
Savings and Loan Ass'n. of Mo. v. Stubbs, 231 Mo. App. 87, 98 S.W.2d 320 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1936).
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the least, these dealings show Hertz Corporation's knowledge of local Rent-A-Car's
activity, which is requisite to implied authority by acquiescence. Under this approach, the principal's acquiescence in the agent's acts is said to indicate implied
39
authorization to perform similar acts in the future.
Apparent authority is another theory employed by third persons to bind
principals for acts of their agents or purported agents.40 The reason for this rests
mainly in the comparative ease of proof. Apparent authority is created by a manifestation by the principal to the third person 41 Since it is incumbent on the party
asserting the existence of the agency to prove his claim,42 it is far easier for the
third person to adduce evidence as to manifestations made to him as opposed to
evidence of manifestations by principal to agent under the implied authority
theory. The Missouri Supreme Court has defined apparent authority as existing
. . . where a principal has by his voluntary act placed an agent in
such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages ... is justified in presuming that such agent has authority....13
A further qualification is that the third person "... is bound to investigate and
assure himself that an agency exists and it is at his peril that he omits to do so." 44
Proof of facts and circumstances sufficient to establish apparent authority usually
consists of showing that: (1) the principal is responsible for having placed the
agent in a position where a reasonable man would assume him to be an agent; or
(2) the principal knowingly acquiesced in the agent's appearance of authority; or
(3) the principal made representations by words or course of conduct that the
agent was his agent; or (4) the principal has provided any other means through
which a third person might reasonably infer agency.

39. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 43 (1958).

40. City of Springfield for Use and Benefit of Horton v. Koch, 228 Mo. App.
511, 72 S.W.2d 191 (Spr. Ct. App. 1934).
41. State ex rel. Massman v. Bland, 355 Mo. 17, 194 S.W.2d 42 (En Banc
1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958).
42. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958). See also cases cited
note 34 supra.
43. Koewing v. Greene County B & L Ass'n., 327 Mo. 680, 688, 38 S.W.2d
40, 43 (1931), cited in State ex rel. Massman v. Bland, 355 Mo. 17, 194 S.W.2d
42 (En Banc 1946). While it is not expressly stated in the court's formula, knowledge on behalf of the principal of the agents activities is necessary before the

principal can be held responsible for having acquiesced (a "voluntary act") in the
agent's assumption of authority. Continental-St. Louis Corp. v. Ray Scharf Vending Co., 400 S.W.2d 467 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966). However, if the principal should
have known, but was negligent in not knowing, knowledge may be inferred. Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App. 384, 79 S.W. 1013 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904). See also
OF AGENCY § 8 (1958). The Restatement notes that
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

apparent authority is based on the objective theory of contracts in that one
should be bound by what he says, not what he intends. Comment d, supra.
44. Seibel v. Harry S. Surkamp Investment Co., 382 S.W.2d 179, 184 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1959). Here, a third person was not justified in assuming a real estate
agency had authority to bind his clients to pay more than the legal maximum
commission to obtain an F.H.A. loan.
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The evidence in the Hertz case will fit several of the above categories. (1)
Because the subsidiary corporation stands between the defendant and local Rent-ACar, it would be difficult to show that Hertz Corporation placed local Rent-A-Car in
its position as agent without first showing that the subsidiary, who presumably
licensed local Rent-A-Car, was also an agent of Hetrz Corporation; this possibility
is considered below. (2) Taking another approach, Hertz Corporation had knowledge of the existence and operation of local Rent-A-Car since reservations for
local Rent-A-Car were made through the principal's New York office; this also
shows a course of conduct as might be expected to exist between principal and
agent. Failure to disapprove of local Rent-A-Car's actions in leading the public to
believe it was an agent of Hertz Corporation would seem to indicate acquiesence 45
(3) The newspaper and magazine advertisements placed by the defendant represented that Hertz service was "worldwide," that wherever you go there is a Hertz
office to serve you. In effect, Hertz was saying you may rely on Hertz agencies
throughout the world because they are ours. In the light of these advertisements,
Hertz's claim that it has nothing to do with Hertz rent-a-car agencies outside the
United States is rather unconvincing. Certainly, a third person should not be
under a duty to investigate Hertz's corporate structure to find that agencies out
of the country are run by a subsidiary. (4) In addition, if it could be shown that
local Hertz's many signs, letterheads and rental forms, all bearing the well-known
"Hertz" insignia, were furnished by or through Hertz Corporation, then defendant
has provided means through which a third person might reasonably infer agency.
Renick v. Brooke46 dealt with facts similar to Hertz. Agency was proved by evidence showing that the company knew Brooke was holding himself out as its
agent and had "provided him the means, such as advertising matter and blank
contracts, to give effect to such representation." 47
The court of appeals in Hertz suggested that agency by estoppel might be an
appropriate theory on which the plaintiffs could proceed. As the term is used and
applied by most courts, it covers a wide range of agency topicsA5 Agency by estoppel has been compared to, used synonomously with, distinguished from, and used
in conjunction with, almost eveiy other agency theory 49 In fact, even the Restate45. See, e.g., Continental-St. Louis Corp. v. Ray Scharf Vending Co., 400
S.W.2d 467 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
46. 190 S.W. 641 (K.C. Mo. App. 1916).
47. Renick v. Brooke, 190 S.W. 641, 642 (K.C. Mo. App. 1916).
48. See Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5 COL. L. REv. 36 (1905) and 6 CoL. L.
Rnv. 34 (1906); and, Ewart, Agency by Estoppel, 5 COL. L. REv. 354 (1905), for a
discussion of opposing views on agency by estoppel.
49. Missouri courts have shown the characteristic degree of confusion that
surrounds agency by estoppel. Most often it is confused with apparent authority.
In Will Doctor Meat Co. v. Hotel Kingsway, 232 S.W.2d 821, 824 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1950), it was said: "Agency by estoppel ... is confined to those cases where
authority is . . . merely apparent." Another case talks about "[Algency by estop-

pel, or by claim of apparent authority." Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. Morris, 404
S.W.2d 229, 231 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966). This indiscriminate use of terms has persisted until, today, the terms agency by estoppel and apparent authority or ostensible agency are used almost interchangeably. See, e.g., State ex rel. Massman v.
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mnent (Second) of Agency has chosen to call it merely "estoppel." 50 Agency by
estoppel is based on the tort concept that where one person has caused another
to change his position to his detriment, it would be unfair to permit him to deny
his causal acts or representations. 51 Thus, agency by estoppel arises when the
principal has intentionally or negligently caused some third person to believe that
another is his agent, and the third person has relied on such appearance to his
detriment. Then, the principal will be estopped to deny the agency and will be
bound the same as if actual agency existed. 52 This formula is strikingly similar to
the definition of apparent authority. 53 The only real difference is that agency by
estoppel requires that the third person suffer a detriment through a change of
position in reliance on the principal's manifestations.5 4 For apparent authority, only
reliance is required.55 In Hertz, either theory is applicable because Cox changed
his position by renting the car in reliance on Hertz Corporation's advertising5 0
Bland, 355 Mo. 17, 194 S.W.2d 42 (En Banc 1946); E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v.
Lowrey, 276 S.W.2d 636 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Wyler Watch Agency v. Hooker,
280 S.W.2d 849 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); and Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App.
384, 79 S.W. 1013 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904). Agency by estoppel has also been confused with implied authority. See, e.g., Wyler Watch Agency v. Hooker supra;
and Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n of Mo. v. Stubbs, 231 Mo. App. 87, 98
S.W.2d 320 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
Of course, Missouri courts are not the sole offenders in misusing agency by
estoppel. See, e.g., Doric Co. v. Leo Jay Rosen Associates, Inc., 303 F.2d 817 (5th
Cir. 1962); U.S. Time Corp. v. G.E.M. of Boston, Inc., 345 Mass. 279, 186 N.E.2d
920 (1962); and Brewer v. Appalachin Constructors, 138 W.Va. 437, 76 S.E.2d
916 (1953).
50. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 8B (1958).
51. W. SEAvEy, AGENCY § 40 (1964).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (1958). The principal must
have knowledge of the facts and circumstances which give rise to the estoppel,
although negligence in not knowing said facts may be sufficient. Delta Realty Co. v.
Hunter, 347 Mo. 1108, 152 S.W.2d 45 (1941).
53. This similarity of definition between apparent authority and agency by
estoppel may be the cause of some of the confusion that exists as to this proper
usage. Apparent authority is based on the objective theory of contract; estoppel is
a tort concept. One author explains the confusion this way: "The statements found
in the cases that apparent authority is based upon estoppel are consistent with the
nineteenth century theory of contracts, by which the intent of the parties rather
than their manifestations are the important factors." W. SEAVEY, AGENCY § 8
(1964), at 15. See also Comment, 69 W.VA. L. REv. 186 (1967).
54. Change of position is defined in note 22 supra.
55. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d (1958).
56. In some situations, as opposed to Hertz, application of the agency by estoppel theory or the apparent authority theory will produce variant results. For
example, there is no estoppel to bind a principal to an executory contract where
the other party has not otherwise changed his position, but the principal can be
bound to the contract by the apparent authority approach. In other cases, apparent
authority may not bind the principal, but agency by estoppel will. See Guthrie v.
Field, 85 Kan. 58, 116 P. 217 (1911), where the principal gave the agent a deed
and instructed him to fill in the blanks and the principal was estopped to deny
that the blanks were correctly filled in, although there was an absence of any apparent authority; and, Shuell v. London Amusement Co., 123 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.

1941).
Agency by estoppel may also be used in some situations where ratification is in-
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There are several other agency approaches which may prevent a national advertiser from insulating himself from liability to persons dealing with its local service agents. As in Hertz, a subsidiary corporation may stand between the parent
corporation and the local agent. It is possible, then, that the subsidiary is an agent
of the parent since one corporation cart be an agent of another. However, this
relationship does not necessarily exist merely because the parent owns all or a
large majority of the subsidiary's stock.57 The subsidiary, being an agent, may
have express authority to appoint subagents, or implied or apparent authority to
appoint subagents where this is the ordinary custom or the principal's business
requires it. Certainly, the business of Hertz Corporation would require the appointment of subagents, by whose acts Hertz Corporation would be bound in the same
ways as by acts of agents.58 Joint adventure has also been used in cases involving
some of the same facts as Hertz.59 But in most cases involving a national advertiser, the "mutual right of control, a right to share in the profits and a duty to
share in the losses" that is requisite to the partnership-like joint adventure relationship would be lacking.60
The agency principles necessary to establish agency relationships from representations made in advertising are neither novel nor newly emerged. Nonetheless,
there are not a great many cases applying them to situations closely resembling
Hertz. An examination of several cases where advertising representations have been
material in proving the existence of an agency relationship will serve to illustrate
the feasibility of applying the principles discussed above in Hertz.
Pigg v. Bridges6 ' presents a situation that resembles Hertz in many respects.
Farmers Insurance Company, co-defendant, appointed Bridges as its "district
agent" to be in charge of a new district office and provided in his contract that
appropriate. When the principal does not have the capacity to act himself, he
cannot later ratify a similar act done while he was incapacitated by an agent, even
though the principal has gained capacity at a later time. However, a statement by
the principal that the agent had authority to act, on which a third person changes
position in reliance, will estop the principal from denying ratification even though
there could be none in fact. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 103 (1958).

57. Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948). See
also State ex rel. Stiers Bros. Constr. Co. v. Hughes, 354 Mo. 659, 190 S.W.2d
880 (En Banc 1945), stating that circumstantial evidence such as the relationship

of the parent and subsidiary, and their conduct and course of dealing may be
used to establish the existence of the agency.
58. Lanowah Inv. Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App.
1062, 162 S.W.2d 307 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942); Hackney v. Fairbanks & Morse Co.,
143 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOm) OF AGENCY §§ 79,
142 (1958).
59. Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963). Here,
Black and White and Checker Cab operated as joint adventurers through a mutual
dispatcher who sent a Checker cab to service a customer who had originally called
for a Black and White cab.
60. State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Mo. En
Banc 1966). Note, however, that § 351.385, RSMo 1959 empowers corporations to
be general or limited partners.
61. 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
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nothing therein was to-be construed as creating an employer-employee relationship.
To publicize the formal opening of the office, advertisements bearing Farmers'
name were placed in the newspapers. The front window of the district office bore
the Farmers Insurance Group insignia and a sign of the same type hung over the
door. Because of these facts and the fact that Farmers' manager participated in
planning and controlling the opening, Farmers was held liable for the plaintiff's
fall and injury as a joint adventurer with Bridges. It is submitted, however, that
if the facts here were changed to conform to the Hertz situation, these advertisements alone would be sufficient to bind Farmers to contracts made by Bridges,
irrespective of any express agreements between Farmers and Bridges. It would be
unnecessary in Hertz to prove joint adventure (including some actual control of
2
the premises) which was requisite in the Farmers case to liability in tort.

Perhaps the best approximation of the Hertz fact situation can be found in
the recurring cases where a third person seeks to hold an oil company liable for
the negligence of a service station attendant. The facts are usually he same: numerous signs are displayed on and around the gas station bearing the oil company
name and insignia; the oil company has advertised its products and the courteous
service to be found at its stations. Cawtkon v. Pillips Petroleum Co.,6 3 a Florida
decision, states the usual rule and conclusions. Plaintiff had his brakes repaired
negligently at a "Phillips 66" station and sought to hold defendent liable, claiming
that the station was defendant's agent on the theories of apparent authority and
agency by estoppel. The court noted that newspaper advertisements bore the
"Phillips 66" name and shield, but nowhere was there any statement that mechanical or repair services were offered. The words "agent" or "agency" did not appear,
and the court found that the word "dealer" which was used does not mean
"agent," citing Kaden. v. Moon Motor Car Co.,6 4 a Missouri appeals decision. The
court in Cawtkon concluded that the advertisements and signs only represented that
Phillips products were being sold at the station and did not pertain to repair
service.0 5 These oil company cases can be distinguished from Hertz, however,
which distinction should lead to the opposite result, viz., agency. The Cawtkon
62. There would be no control requirement (as is necessary for respondeat
superior) in Hertz as liability is not sought to be predicated on a tort by the agent
local Rent-A-Car. See also text at note 76 stpra.
63. 124 So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1960).
64. 26 S.W.2d 812 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930). The court stated at 814, "We
cannot understand how the advertisements, affirmatively showing the Flesher
Motor Sales Co. as a direct factory dealer, could fairly be construed as holding
any proof that such company was an agent for defendant." See also Paton v. Buick
Mtr. Div., Gen. Mtrs. Corp. 401 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1966).
65. The same conclusion as in Cawthon is reached in Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d
815 (Okla. 1963), and Rothrock v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 26, 197 S.E. 568 (1938).
Compare Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. 1965) (dictum), where
the court recognizes that defendant advertised to the public nationally "not only
Sun's quality products but Sun's quality service," and in an appropriate case Sun
might be liable for negligent service at one of its stations on this basis. See also
Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962), dealing with the effects of brand name advertising by oil companies.
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court found that the oil company advertisements should be construed as representing the sale of its products only. A like construction would be difficult, indeed, to
reach in Hertz because Hertz Corporation's main activity is the rental of cars
(service) and this is exactly what was advertised. Advertisements by used car
dealers, 6 mobile home dealers,67 open air market owners,68 and real estate
brokers 0 have also led to liability for the advertiser.
The impact of the decision in Crowe v. Hertz Corp. extends far beyond the
case itself. Perhaps it will signal an awakening to the fact that the law as it
stands today, and even more so in the future,70 provides remedies which will
pierce the insulation an imprudent advertiser may seek to place between himself
and his local service agents and the public7
KENNE'H H. SUELTHAUS

66. Paul Hellman, Inc. v. Reed, 366 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1961).
67. Walker v. Pacific Mobile Homes, Inc., 68 Wash.2d 347, 413 P.2d 3 (1966).
68. Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 20 Ohio Op. 233, 34
N.E.2d 202 (1941).
69. Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En
Banc 1966). Defendant advertised and its sales agent represented that the subdivision in which plaintiff bought a home had an adequate supply of state approved water. This was untrue and the plaintiff prevailed in an action for fraud
(intentional misstatement). Change the facts slightly, however, and the case is
similar to Hertz where a corporation represents through advertising those things
which the public must obtain through a local agent.
70. See notes 24 and 27 supra, discussing, in part, trends of expansion in the
areas of warranty and misrepresentations.
71. For example: an airline advertising that $20,000 of life insurance on all
passengers is included in its fares could not set up a foreign corporation to operate
overseas flights to escape liability for payment of insurance claims on overseas
crashes; a national tire manufacturer could not advertise brake service at its
service centers and escape liability by claiming the service center was a dealer
or independent contractor; or, a department store could not disclaim liability for
wrongs committed by departments (e.g., autoparts) within the store which are
actually run by an independent contractor, but advertises under the store's
name.
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